Mali Crisis Deepens as JNIM Militants Capture Strategic Strongholds
The al-Qaeda affiliate group JNIM has pushed Mali’s capital, Bamako, to its breaking point through a months-long siege. JNIM fighters have created an economic and fuel blockade since September. They sealed major highways that tankers use to transport fuel from Senegal and Ivory Coast. This landlocked Sahel country now faces unprecedented challenges as the militant group tightens its grip over Mali.
JNIM’s threats go beyond paralyzing cities – they spread violence everywhere. More than 17,700 people have lost their lives in this insurgency. All but one of these deaths happened after 2020. Bamako’s residents stay indoors because they can’t find transportation. Many parts of the city have no electricity and closed shops. Food prices keep climbing. The Sahel region’s share of global terrorism-related deaths has reached 51 percent. These deaths have multiplied tenfold since 2019.
JNIM’s strategy shows how sophisticated they’ve become at taking control. The militants attacked a convoy of more than 100 fuel trucks in mid-September and destroyed half of them. This brutal assault proves how the group has evolved from rural insurgency to urban siege tactics. The military struggles to fight back while JNIM builds up resources. They raid villages, steal cattle, smuggle goods, kidnap people, and force communities under their control to pay taxes.
JNIM Forces Capture Strategic Towns in Mali
JNIM’s control over Malian territory grew rapidly in recent months. The al-Qaeda-linked group captured several strategic towns and changed its approach from rural insurgency to directly challenging government control in urban areas.
Military sources confirm loss of key regions
Military and security sources acknowledged major territorial losses as JNIM fighters stepped up their offensive. The Mali army released an official statement after the Boulikessi attack. They said they “reacted vigorously” before “withdrawing” – which shows a tactical retreat. The army claimed they “repelled an infiltration attempt” in Timbuktu. However, unnamed local sources told a different story. They said JNIM had “cleared the camp” and caused many casualties. The militants also launched seven attacks at the same time. These attacks covered hundreds of kilometers in western Mali near the Senegal and Mauritania borders on July 1, 2025.
Which areas are now under JNIM control?
JNIM now controls several key areas in Mali’s western and central regions. The FLM (Macina Liberation Front, a JNIM component) took over Farabougou town in central Mali’s Segou Region in August 2025. This victory carries special meaning because Farabougou was once a strategic outpost that watched militant movements. The militants also captured Lere town in November 2024. JNIM’s grip on major towns remains shaky, but they control Nioro and gold-rich Kayes through blockades. They destroy roads and bridges to maintain this control. The group also surrounds major cities like Timbuktu and Gao, along with Menaka and Boni towns.
How the group bypassed government defenses
JNIM uses sophisticated tactics to overpower government forces. The July 1 attacks showed their capabilities when they struck seven different locations at once, some hundreds of kilometers apart. This strategy forces Mali’s already thin military to spread out even more. JNIM doesn’t use traditional siege tactics. Instead, they create “networked disruption” by blocking roads that connect Mali to coastal neighbors. The group runs on mobility. Their fighters use motorcycles and small arms to strike quickly before escaping into rough terrain.
How JNIM Uses Fuel Blockades to Cripple Bamako
Image Source: Reuters
Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM started an aggressive economic warfare strategy against Mali’s capital in September 2025. The group systematically targeted the nation’s fuel supply chains. This blockade shows a fundamental change from territorial conquest to resource deprivation tactics.
JNIM attacks convoys and tankers
JNIM militants blocked oil tankers carrying fuel to Bamako after the Malian government banned small-scale fuel sales in rural areas. They specifically targeted convoys from neighboring countries that supply Mali’s fuel. Fighters attacked multiple fuel convoys under military escort between Diédiéni and Kolokani, about 100 km from Bamako on September 13-14. The next day, they ambushed another convoy of about 40 fuel tankers between Kaniéra and Lakamané. Reports indicate JNIM has set fire to about 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. The militants have also kidnapped drivers and soldiers during these ambushes. Terrorists abducted six truck drivers from Senegal on September 5, but released them the next day.
Fuel shortages paralyze daily life
The two-month blockade has brought Bamako’s daily operations to a halt. Schools and universities remained closed for two weeks. Fuel prices have skyrocketed by over 400% in areas where it’s still available, jumping from AED 91.80 to AED 477.35 per liter. This crisis affects more than just transportation. Bamako faces widespread electricity shortages because Mali needs 500 million liters of fuel annually for power generation. Shops have closed down, food prices keep rising, and many residents can’t leave their homes due to lack of transportation. The crisis has hit agriculture hard, with harvest-season machinery sitting idle without fuel.
Critical threats JNIM poses to urban centers
JNIM uses psychological pressure by creating a sense that Bamako is under siege. Their strategy centers on “economic jihad”—they want to delegitimize the government by targeting the economy’s foundation. JNIM can’t militarily capture Bamako, but they want to spark popular discontent against Mali’s military rulers. Bamako residents’ frustration grows as they ask for government action. JNIM has announced travel restrictions outside the capital and ordered women to wear hijabs on public transport—hinting at their urban governance ambitions.
Why the Malian Military Struggles to Respond
Mali’s military struggles with unprecedented challenges as JNIM’s threat continues to grow. Several key factors make it hard to fight this insurgency effectively.
Russian Africa Corps fails to secure supply lines
The Russian Africa Corps took over from Wagner Group in June 2025, but they haven’t stopped JNIM’s advances. Mali has become less secure over the last four years despite Russian military presence, while jihadists grow stronger and bolder. JNIM launched a devastating ambush near Ténenkou in August 2023 that killed 14 Russians and more than 35 Malian soldiers. Russian troops now operate outside Mali’s chain of command and take resources and transport for themselves, which creates tension with Malian forces. Local populations have turned against these forces because of human rights violations. Malian security forces and their Russian allies are responsible for 77% (2,194 deaths) of civilian deaths from targeted attacks in two years.
Internal divisions and coup fears weaken response
The junta’s grip on power has weakened. This became clear when 55 soldiers, including respected generals Dembélé and Sagara, were arrested in August 2025 for allegedly plotting a coup. General Dembélé had spoken out against Russian paramilitaries’ abuses in central Mali. Military tensions have grown since Colonel Assimi Goïta named himself president with a five-year renewable term in July 2025. The junta shut down all political parties in May 2025, which led intelligence services to focus on tracking political opponents rather than fighting terrorism.
No imminent threat of recapture, say analysts
Without doubt, JNIM uses irregular warfare tactics that work well against the Malian army’s conventional structure. The military can’t launch coordinated counteroffensives across multiple blockade zones because their forces are spread too thin. Mali’s problems have gotten worse since they cut ties with French forces, MINUSMA, and regional allies, leaving the junta with no outside support. Bakary Sambe from the Timbuktu Institute explains JNIM’s strategy: “It is not their objective,” noting they use “economic suffocation” instead of direct military attacks.
What JNIM’s Strategy Reveals About Its Long-Term Goals
Image Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
JNIM’s evolving tactics reveal a well-thought-out vision that goes way beyond territorial control. The group’s approach shows sophisticated planning that aims to weaken state authority through multiple pressure points.
From rural insurgency to urban siege
JNIM has steadily moved from isolated rural attacks to coordinated urban pressure. The group started in remote areas and now influences major population centers without direct military occupation. Their fighters travel light on motorcycles and strike quickly before retreating into rough terrain. This approach helps them maintain presence in big regions with minimal resources, which creates “networked disruption” instead of conventional military occupation.
Economic warfare and psychological pressure
The group’s blockade strategy serves psychological objectives that go beyond immediate resource shortages. JNIM strangles Bamako’s fuel supply to create an impression of a besieged capital. This “economic jihad” weakens government authority without needing urban conquest. The group targets citizens’ daily lives to encourage popular discontent against Mali’s military rulers. They have started to impose travel restrictions and religious dress codes in areas they control to test potential governance models.
Is JNIM aiming for regime change?
Recent evidence points to JNIM seeking gradual state collapse through systematic pressure rather than direct overthrow. The group has changed from avoiding state structures to actively targeting them, which shows their growing political ambition. Their slow-burn strategy works to drain governmental resources until internal pressures trigger regime collapse. These blockades show both patience and pragmatism—traits of an organization playing the long game.
JNIM’s rise has revolutionized Mali’s security landscape. This al-Qaeda affiliate has grown from a rural insurgency into a sophisticated network that can paralyze major urban centers. Their siege of Bamako through fuel blockades shows they understand economic warfare better than conventional military conquest.
The group now controls much of Mali’s territory, particularly in western and central regions. Their coordinated attacks that span hundreds of kilometers demonstrate capabilities way beyond the reach and influence of typical insurgent groups. Quick to strike and retreat, they maintain influence over big areas with minimal resources.
Mali’s military faces several challenges in response. The Russian Africa Corps has not secured vital supply lines despite its years of presence. The military junta’s internal divisions create more vulnerabilities as resources move toward political control instead of counterterrorism.
The most concerning aspect is JNIM’s strategy that reveals their long-term goals to collapse the state through systematic pressure. These militants combine economic strangulation with psychological warfare to show Mali’s government cannot protect its citizens or provide basic services. Public frustration grows as daily life becomes harder under fuel shortages and rising prices.
JNIM’s patient approach shows an organization playing the long game that waits for internal pressures to trigger regime collapse rather than attempting direct overthrow. This calculated strategy and Mali’s growing isolation from international partners pose an existential threat to Malian sovereignty. Modern insurgencies can challenge state authority without conventional military superiority by targeting the economic foundations that support government legitimacy.
